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DD/S 71-1808

1 1 MAY 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Informal Junior Officers Study Group

	1. At the Morning Meeting on 5 May 1971 Colonel White raised	
	the matter of a move by the so-called Informal Junior Officers Study	
	Group to look into the question of the Agency and minority races. He	25X1
	noted they had met with O/P, who had backed away	
25X1	when asked for specific statistics. The group then apparently went to	
	n her capacity as Agency Equal Opportunity Officer	
	where again specifics had been requested. Colonel White posed to the	
	Morning Meeting the question of the standing, status, stature or whatever	
	of this group noting his belief that it had none of these. Specifically noted	
	was the point that we could certainly not have in such a group an unofficial	
	IG. Mr. Proctor was asked to meet with at least the principals of the	
	group to attempt to sort out what it is they consider what they are about.	
	After the meeting I spoke with D/Personnel and obtained from him the	25X1
	memorandum prepared by Mr. detailing his interaction with the	
	group. I spoke to Mr. Cunningham, DTR, who believes that we should	
	certainly be talking to the group but agrees that it has no right "to informa-	
	tion or access to offices".	
	2 At the 7 Mary 1971 Manning Macting Mr. Proposes and decree	
	2. At the 7 May 1971 Morning Meeting Mr. Proctor reported on a discussion he and Mr. Richard Lehman had with four members of the so-	
	called Junior Officers Study Group. He expressed the view that they are not	
	malicious and could be helpful. On the matter of minorities he said their	
	intent was to identify better ways to recruit more and better qualified blacks.	
	Mr. Proctor had proposed that the group commit its views/suggestions/	
25	proposals to paper. He also expressed the view that rather than having them	
25,	run all over the Agency the Agency designate a "sponsor" for them. When	
	Mr. asked if that suggestion meant recognition for the group	
	Mr. Proctor changed "sponsor" to read "advisor". Mr. Proctor said that	
	the subject should next be discussed more fully at a Deputies Meeting. The	
	Director "appreciated" the discussion reported by Mr. Proctor and agreed	

MORI/CDF Pages 1 & 2...




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that a Deputies Meeting is the proper next forum in which to consider the matter. We must decide whether and in what capacity we talk to the group or its members. We must establish guidelines to their status and the status of any Agency representative who talks to them. We must also establish rules as to duty hour versus non-duty hour time, etc.

John W. Coffey
Deputy/Director
for Support

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cc: D/P DTR 

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6 May 1971

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Junior Officers' Study Group

- 1. My first knowledge of the formation of this informal discussion group came with receipt of an information copy of the memorandum of announcement, a copy of which is attached at Tab A.
- 2. Some two or three weeks thereafter I received a call from who indicated that the initial reaction of the addressees, plus a few other senior officers with whom he and his colleagues had talked, was generally favorable—at least, not discouraging. He stated that the Study Group had no specific plans but expected to carry on for a while to see what interests and participation might develop. He extended a sort of general invitation to attend a group meeting.
- 3. A few days later he invited me to meet with the group on 13 April. No specific agenda was mentioned, but he indicated that the group was interested in learning something about employment of minority groups. As an example of their interests and activity he offered to--and subsequently did--send me a copy of suggestions they had submitted for the Director's speech to the newspaper editors in April. A copy of that memo is attached at Tab B. I was not able to attend the meeting on 13 April.
- 4. The invitation was renewed for 27 April, at 11:30 a.m., in a conference room in 3 E 61. The subject was to be personnel, particularly minority employment, and a list of questions was sent to me in advance (copy at Tab C). This time I attended. Present were nine or ten people, including, as I recall, the signers of Tab B plus CA Staff, and two or three others who came in late and were not introduced. The discussion went on for about an hour, and was lively, friendly and—it seemed to me—constructive. I commented generally on each of the questions listed. With respect to No. 2, I gave them approximate percentages by Directorate, but went into no further detail. On No. 5, I referred them to the Psychological Services Staff. On No. 8, again I generalized and offered no specifics. On No. 10, I mentioned the rate of 5% which has held steady

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GROUP 1
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for more than ten years. More important than these questions, however, I tried to convey some understanding of the Agency's awareness, concern and constructive efforts with respect to minority group employment. I got the distinct impression that they found the discussion informative, interesting, and even reassuring. I told them at the outset that they would find me and others ready to talk with them so long as they really are interested in improving their background knowledge and understanding. I warned them, however, against assuming an investigative role and starting to point fingers.

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Deputy Director of Personnel for Recruitment and Placement

Attachments

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12 March 1971

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Gordon Stewart, IG

Mr. Hugh Cunningham, D/OTR Mr. Abbot Swith, D/ONE Mr. Richard Lehman, D/OCI The Management Advisory Group

SUBJECT:

An Informal Junior Officers' Study Croup

- 1. With a firm commitment to creative careers in the CIA, we are in the early stages of constituting an informal junior officers' study group to discuss broad topics of common concern. Our idea was spontaneous, but we have decided to announce our intentions only after considerable thought.
- 2. We are motivated principally by the desire to engage in and encourage wider dialogue within the CIA. We begin this as a learning and sharing process, not with answers prepared, but with a dynamic interest in joining with as many professionals as possible in constructive, candid talk about the nature and future of the CIA. We favor greater communication within Agency components at all levels. We are concerned with the discrepancy in the public eye between the CIA's image and its actual role in government. We are interested in both substantive and administrative questions.
- 3. In the immediate future, we plan to invite some additional junior officers from the various directorates to join us in regular discussion groups. We do not plan to publicize our activities, and we are not certain what level of participation can be sustained. If sufficient interest is generated, we would be anxious to expand our study sessions and seminars to include interested officers from all levels.

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4. Our hope is to generate ideas and dialogue -- not controversy. We believe that with the cooperation of Agency management our study group will provide positive new perspectives on important issues. At the very least, conscientious and committed young officers will be able to come together (with full appreciation of security considerations) and to discuss problems common to their unique and exciting profession.

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2 April 1971

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Gordon Stewart, IC

Mr. Hugh Cunningham, D/OTR

Mr. Abbot Smith, D/ONE

Mr. Edward Proctor, D/DDI Mr. Rischard Lehman, D/OCI

The Management Advisory Group

Executive Assistant to the DCI

FROM

: The Junior Officers' Study Group

SUBJECT

Some Suggestions for the DCI's Speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April

- 1. The draft outline of the DCI's speech covers quite well a number of key points, such as the need for reliable intelligence to assess foreign capabilities and intentions, a central authority to coordinate and prepare intelligence collection and analysis, objective reporting, and protection for intelligence sources vulnerable to hostile counteraction. This memorandum offers some additional ideas for the speech to round out the picture.
- 2. Our overall view is that the speech should be as positive as possible. It should stress the services that the CIA performs for the policy maker, above all the analytical work. The speech

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should be as factual as possible, giving enough of the mundame details of our daily work to convince the audience that our work is not all James Bond-like adventure. The thems might be the capabilities and activities of the "unknown CIA," i.e., the analytical directorates.

3. Another general suggestion is that the speech be specifically geared to an audience of newspaper editors. For example, in discussing the Agency's commitment to objectivity in its analysis, the following line could be taken: "In our reporting, we are committed to the same ideals as the press -- completeness, accuracy, balance, and above all objectivity. Moreover, in our daily, weekly, and longer range estimative analysis, we have no editorial pages. Our goal is straight, factual reporting on what is happening and what is likely to happen abroad. We do not make policy recommendations. Our mandate is to provide accurate information and judgments on the basis of which policy decisions can be taken. In 1962, we provided President Kennedy with the information that missiles were being located in Cuba. He and other policy makers decided how to respond."

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- Our specific proposals generally fit into the category of answering some basic misconceptions about the CIA which are rooted in the idea of the Agency as a clandestine monolith. Many Americans hold as an article of faith these days that the CIA is involved in US domestic politics, that it conducts surveillance, espionage, and other unseemly activities in the US against US citizens, and that it is a right wing organization which opposes popular revolutions abroad and promotes the cause of rightwing dictatorships the world over. The book, The Invisible Government, is widely regarded as the definitive analysis of the CIA's role, and scholars tend to accept conclusions from it based on allegations which they would automatically reject or subject to scrutiny were they made about any entity other than the CIA. Many who should know better are convinced that there are no effective controls over the Agency's activities, that in effect it operates independently of the executive branch of government. Some approve of the CIA's role as they see it, and some disapprove. It is equally important to disabuse both groups of their notions.
- 5. The draft speech explains the governmental controls over the Agency's activities quite well, but it could do more to dispel

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explicitly between the CIA's role and that of the FBI. Stress
might be laid on the fact that the CIA is responsible only for
foreign intelligence. On this theme, it would probably be constructive to explain publicly the nature of the

The newspapermen could be told that the CIA has offices in some US cities, but only to contact openly those Americans who have developed an expertise that is of use to our analytical s specialists.

6. The draft speech asserts that it is "axiomatic" that an intelligence organization must strive for secrecy. This is true to protect human sources in sensitive clandestine operations and technical sources that could be countered. But we think the DCI's speech might point out that the CIA spends much of its time doing analytical work and that a great deal of this is not terribly secretive. In fact, the Agency now encourages most of analysts to admit publicly were they work, to be fully identified on dust jackets of books they author, and to participate as CIA employees at a variety of professional conferences. In short, CIA analysts are a part of the larger community of economists, scientists, foreign affairs experts, and political scientists examining events abroad.

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- The draft speech discusses CIA analysis in some detail 7. and offers some useful examples of its importance (e.g., during the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967); it also stresses the number of advanced degrees held by CIA analysts and the depth of their expertise. We think it would be useful to add that their work assumes extra importance today for a number of reasons. The US government wants to know what's going on all over the world, even in countries usually ignored by academic specialists. Moreover, the CIA has the manpower and skills to deal with the information explosion and demands for precise information on a host of technical subjects (such as the Soviet weapons and space programs). The type of scholar who tended to focus on foreign affairs in the 1940s and 1950s today appears to be shifting his attention to serious domestic porblems: the fate of the cities, housing, race relations, education, welfare, and national priorities in the general. The work of the CIA's analytical components is more essential than it was 15 years ago.
- 8. The CIA's growing responsibilities in the areas of science and technology, especially concerning modern weapons systems, might also be discussed in some detail. The U2 story is appropriate,

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but it might also be useful to add the notion that the CIA plays a vital role in preparing the US representatives for the SALT talks. Only through technical evaluation by many-CIA scientists and other technical specialists have estimates of the USSR's strategie weapons capabilities been available to the US negotiators. Regardless of the outcome of the talks, the requirement for sophisticated intelligence will remain -- both to monitor Soviet technical developments and to evaluate whether or not the Soviets meet the terms of any agreement that is produced.

There are other points that could be added constructively: such as a definition of the intelligence community, the role of the DCI himself, his relations with policy makers on the National Security Council, and the general theme of "Keeping the State Department and Pentagon honest." By taking a positive tone, the speech would help disabuse the public of many of its misplaced articles of faith about the CIA.

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Some Questions f	or	Office of Personne
FROM: The Junio	or Officana Study ou	

- 1. Does the CIA employ any black recruiters? If so, how many? Where are they concentrating their recruiting? Are they more effective in recruiting blacks than their white counterparts?
- 2. What is the percentage of black employees in each office and each directorate? How many are over GS-11? Does the CIA work through black employees to hire more?
- 3. What is the geographical distribution of clerical employees in general (e.g., what percentage come from Western Pa. and West Virginia)?
- 4. Please summarize the Agency's experimental program for hiring under-qualified, black secretaries. Is the program still in effect? How is it going? Are the new, under-privileged employees given advanced training after coming on board?
- 5. Has the Office of Personnel considered using the type of culturefree aptitude tests now being tried out in California?
- 6. To what extent is the CIA willing to changes its standards of admission for blacks? Its security requirements?

- 7. What jobs in CIA could be broken up into simpler, smaller jobs?

 Is it feasible to separate manual labor from analytical labor?
- 8. How are blacks already on board doing in terms of quality step increases and promotions in general? Is the statistical base large enough to permit accurate assessments?
- 9. What studies has the CIA undertaken to examine patterns of discrimination within the Agency?
- 10. What is the percentage of black employees today as compared to five and ten years ago?